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Abstract: The paper gives a critical review of the Serbian legislation in 
force on cooperatives, idetifying legal gaps and other problems in it, which 
could adversly influence the operation of cooperatives in Serbia. The work 
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I. Introduction 
Currently Serbia is struggling between eastern and western social models 
and “values“. At the same time, there is one valuable institution with a long 
tradition in Serbia “under threat“. This is the institution of cooperative. Coop-
eratives in Serbia can be traced back to the middle ages, to feudal and later to 
Turkish times, when families lived in village cooperatives to survive these very 
hard historic times.1 Compared to other societies of the period, the basic princi-
ples of functioning of these cooperatives on the Balkans were rather democratic 
and human.2 Aleksa S. Jovanović, a Serbian lawyer, politician and historian, for 
example wrote that they were based “on love and moral dependency“, and em-
phasised the equility of their members.3 These village cooperatives disappeared 
–––––––––– 
1 Z. Stefanović, J. Hrle, Statusno privredno pravo, Fakultet za poslovno pravo, Beograd, 
2005, p. 50; L. Mihajlović, Kolektivni oblik ekonomije, Magazin Poljoprivreda, 11/2003, p. 3; See 
also: N. Ilijić, Istorija zadruge kod Srba, Službeni list SRJ, Beograd, 1999. 
2 However, we may not forget that women had only very limited rights in these coopera-
tives. (N. Novaković, Teorije o nastanku i strukturi porodičnih zadruga, Stanovništvo, 1-4/2005, 
p. 109.) 
3 N. Novaković, op. cit., p. 108. 
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in the 19th century thanks to the strong pressure from the new Serbian feudalist 
landlords and to the headway of capitalism. However, they have left a deep 
mark in the Serbian society in a positive sense (e.g., strong feeling of liability 
for other members of the society, etc.). Unfortunatelly, during the 20th century, 
first the capitalism and later the socialism, stamped out lot of these social values 
from this institution.4 
In spite of this, even today, many experts who deal with cooperatives, 
emphasise the potential social and economic importance of cooperatives. 
Thus, they point out that cooperatives can offer a democratic and participatory 
way of decision making, pay fair wages and ensure safe income for their 
members without exploiting them.5 All this can contribute to the creation of a 
more stable and democratic society in general. Besides these values, coopera-
tives can help solving one of the most serious agricultural problems of transi-
tion in Serbia: the average agricultural farm is quite small, 2,5 hectars6, and 
from economic aspect this means that many times farming is not profitable on 
these properties. At the same time, farmers do not have the necessary means 
to enlarge these farms, as the price of arable land is relatively high in the re-
gion. To this serious economic and social problem, farming within the scope 
of cooperatives could be the solution. 
The problem is that there are some severe shortcomings of the current 
regulation of cooperatives in Serbia, and no institution can functionsuccesully 
without appropriate legal and institutional framework. At the same time, it 
seems that there is no willingness to reform the system. This work does not 
intend to find out the reasons of such indifference of the State towards this is-
sue, but wants to describe the current state of law (lex lata) and its solutions 
regarding issues like membership, assets and organs of the cooperative, pointing 
out major inadequacies and making some suggestions regarding reforms, taking 
into account the Regulation on the Statute for a European Cooperative Society 
of the European Union (SCE)7 and the ICA Statement and Guidelines for Coop-
erative Legislation (GCL). 
–––––––––– 
4 Z. Njegovan, Agrarno ili zadružno pitanje: prilog za razumevanje zadrugarstva u Repub-
lici Srbiji, Ekonomika preduzeća, 2011, p. 306. 
5 M. Bateman, J. Pennarz, Socijalna preduzeća u Srbiji: Zadruge – Institucionalni okvir i 
iskustva iz prakse, UNDP Srbija: ITAD, 2008, p. 6. See also: I. Tomić, Poslovni moral u 
zadrugarstvu u funkciji modela demokratizacije društva, Nacionalni interes, 2/2012, 
pp. 281-292. 
6 Source: Ekonomski fakultet Beograd, Definisanje poljoprivrede, slika našeg agrara, 
<www.ekof.bg.ac.yu/nastava/ekonomika_agrara/2007-08/Definisanje%20poljoprivrede%202007.ppt>, 
visited on Dec. 12, 2014. 
7 Council Regulation (EC) no. 1435/2003 of 22 July 2003 on the Statute for a European 
Cooperative Society. 
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II. Legal background 
The Constitution of the Republic of Serbia (hereinafter: Constitution) provides 
the framework for the adoption of detailed laws and other legal acts in the field of 
cooperatives. At the same time, it is also the most important guarantee of basic 
human rights, which form part of cooperative values. In its first article, the Consti-
tution states that the Serbian State is based on the “rule of law and social justice, 
principles of civil democracy, human and minority rights and freedoms […]”. One 
of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution, the freedom of association, is particu-
larly important, as this is the basis for the regulation of cooperatives with laws and 
lower legal acts. The Constitution provides that associations can be formed without 
prior approval and entered in the register kept by an administrative body of the 
State.8 Cooperative principles are also guaranteed by other relevant provisions, like 
that on the protection of private property.9 Cooperative assets (“zadružna svojina”) 
are expressly mentioned by the Constitution: “Private, cooperative and public assets 
shall be guaranteed.”10 Besides this, the Constitution provides for the free exercise 
of lawful profession11, free entrepreneurship12 and for the right to development13. 
These principles of free market economy are essential conditions of sound devel-
opment of cooperatives in a democratic society. 
Although the Constitution contains adequate provisions needed for the de-
velopment of cooperatives, the same can not be said about the laws regulating 
this field. Currently, there are two laws in force that regulate this subject matter. 
One was “inherited” from the Federative Republic of Yugoslavia; this is the so-
called “federal” law, i.e., the Law on Cooperatives, published in the Official 
Gazette of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia nos. 41/96 and 12/98 andOfficial 
Herald of the Republic of Serbia nos. 101/2005 and 34/2006 (hereinafter: FLC). 
The other is the so-called “republican” law, the Law on Cooperatives published 
in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia nos. 57/89, 67/93, 46/95 and 
101/2005 (hereinafter: RLC). The reason for having two laws in force is that 
during the existence of the Federation, the republics had the right to regulate in 
parallel certain fields of law (however, the federal law was always of stronger 
legal force and more general laws as the republican laws had to be within the 
boundaries set by the federal law), and following the dissolution of Yugoslavia 
(and later of the Union of Serbia and Montenegro) the Republic of Serbia “in-
herited” the FLC as it became legal successor of the old state. 
–––––––––– 
8 Art. 55, Constitution. 
9 Art. 58 (1), Constitution. 
10 Art. 86(1), Constitution. 
11 Art. 60(2), Constitution. 
12 Art. 83(1), Constitution. 
13 Art. 23(2), Constitution. 
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In our opinion, having two laws in the same legal system regulating the 
same subject matter is a serious problem that should be solved urgently, because 
it affects legal security. In a legal system that is based on the traditions of the 
continental law we can not expect that one of the laws will become obsolete. This 
is definitely the task of the lawmaker, i.e., the Serbian Parliament. This problem is 
somewhat mitigated by the fact that in practice, courts apply the FLC.14 
Another problem is that the laws were adopted at the time when market 
economy did not function properly in Serbia. Thus, some of their solutions are 
obsolete. 
Technically, there are two possible solutions for this. The first one would 
be to repeal the old republican law, as courts do not apply this one, and to 
amend (reform) the federal one. However, the most clear solution to this chal-
lenge would be to overrule both of them by adopting an entirely new legislation 
for cooperatives. This should involve the reform of lower legal acts as well, 
which opinion is supported by some authors from this field.15 
 
III. Membership 
According to the current law, cooperatives are founded by natural persons 
(except pupil cooperatives16).17 Legally, these persons become members of the 
cooperative when the cooperative is founded. Persons who want to join the 
cooperative later, become members with signing a declaration of affiliation 
(“pristupnaizjava”). However, this is preceded by an application for member-
ship (“zahtev”). The by-laws of the cooperative should define the organ that 
decides on the application. In practice, sometimes it happens that the manager 
of the cooperative decides on the application for membership without having 
explicit authorization for this. Theoretically, this should not be a problem, as for 
example the SCE Regulation provides that the management or the administra-
tive organ of the cooperative should have the right to approve the application 
for membership.18 However, there always must be a legal ground for such deci-
–––––––––– 
14 This is supported by our research done in one of the largest legal databases in Serbia 
(Paragraf Net). There is only one case related to the republican Law on Cooperatives (Decision of 
the Supreme Court of Serbia, Prev. 221/93 of 11.1.1994) and two court opinions in this database, 
while related to the federal Law on Cooperatives there are more than thirty court decisions and 
opinions.This is the reason why this work gives primarily a critical analyzes of the so-called 
Federal Law; at the same time, drawing attention to substantially different solutions offered by the 
Republican Law when it is necessary. 
15 M. Bateman, J. Pennarz, op. cit., p. 36. Z. Simonović, D. Cvijanović, Neki aktuelni prob-
lemi zadrugarstva Srbije u tranzicionim kretanjima, Ekonomika, 2008, pp. 131-138. 
16 Art. 16, FLC. 
17 Art. 15, FLC. 
18 Art. 14 (1), SCE Regulation. 
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sion, i.e., the authorization for this has to be stated in the by-laws expressly. 
Some argue that membership is an issue that affects all the members because of 
the character of the cooperative, and thus, it would be advisable that (all) the 
members (i.e., the general assembly) decide on this issue. However, practically 
it might be very cumbersome and impractical to convene the general assembly 
only for this reason. Thus, some authors support the view that the board of di-
rectors could be the organ which decides on it, as it implements the business 
policy of the cooperative (this is suggested for example by Vlatković19). 
Another problem related to the membership application is that many times 
in practice, the by-laws contain no provision on the requirements that have to be 
fulfilled when applying for membership, even though, the FLC provides that the 
conditions and mode of acquiring membership status should be stipulated in the 
by-laws. Thus, it would be advisable to require the cooperative by the law, un-
der pain, to have such requirements laid down in the by-laws, or at least to pro-
vide for basic principles regarding these requirements. On the other hand, hav-
ing too many requirements in the by-laws would not support the principle of 
“open door” when accepting members.20 
Regarding the application procedure for membership, once the application 
is submitted, the competent organ has 30 days to inform the applicant on its 
decision. However, the FLC prescribes that when there is no information (deci-
sion) within 30 days, the application is considered not accepted. It should be 
mentioned here that the GCL states that in general there should be no obstacle 
admitting members to a cooperative, what is called the “open door” principle, 
meaning that no information on the acceptance within a certain period of time 
should mean acceptance after the lapse of the same time period. Thus, it can be 
concluded that the Serbian FLC applies the principle of “closed door”. This is 
contrary to international standards and practice, which apply the principle of 
„open door“. Some authors even suggest that the applicant should be notified 
about the decision immediately and the refusal must be justified and in writ-
ing.21 Thus, the solution of the current legislation where with the lapse of thirty 
days without notification the application is considered refused without any justi-
–––––––––– 
19 M. Vlatković, Omladinske i studentske zadruge, NIP, Beograd, 1999, p. 41. 
20 For some types of cooperatives, the FLC prescribes that their members must fulfill cer-
tain conditions. Thus, agricultural cooperatives can be established by people working in agricul-
ture (or owning or using agricultural land), handicraft cooperatives can be established by profes-
sionals in the given handicraft, health cooperatives have to have at least one member who is a 
physician, and so on. (art. 9, FLC) These are on the one hand restrictive provisions (e.g., against 
the “open door” principle), but on the other hand, they ensure professionalism of the members. 
Thus, until they are reasonable, they should be supported in our opinion. 
21 H. Henrÿ, Guidelines for Cooperative Legislation, International Labour Office, Geneva, 
2005, pp. 27, 28. 
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fication is alien to these recommendations.Introducing these international stan-
dars would limit the autonomy of the members to a certain extent, however, 
such solution would motivate cooperatives not to refuse applications without 
good cause. 
If the application is refused or “not accepted”, the applicant has the right to 
appeal to the general assembly of the cooperative.22 This is in accordance with 
the provisions of the SCE Regulation.23 
However, the current legislation does not provide for the possibility of 
complaint to a court against the refusal of membership application. The appli-
cant should also have the right to appeal to a court of law against the decision of 
the general assembly.24 Such solution would offer better legal security and 
should be introduced to the law. 
Regarding the issue of who can become member of the cooperative, the 
GCL suggests that both natural and legal persons should be allowed to become 
members of the cooperative as long as the principle of “one member one vote” 
is respected.25 Based on the analysis of European legislation in this field, under 
certain limitations it should be allowed. Namely, this would make possible the 
foundation of so-called secondary cooperatives, that is to say cooperatives 
founded and operated by other cooperatives. This would be helpful for smaller 
cooperatives to access markets. Besides, this way investor members could be-
come members of the cooperative (with certain restrictions, for example, the 
number of investor members in the cooperative should not exceed ten percent of 
all members, and the nominal value of the investor share should not exceed 
thirty percent of the share capital of the cooperative), as one of the largest prob-
lem of cooperatives is the lack of capital. Such solution would certainly help 
cooperatives to secure fresh capital, as this is one of the main problems of coop-
eratives operating in Serbia. Having investor members is also advocated by the 
SCE Regulation.26 At the same time, there should be restrictions to protect 
members with moderate financial possibilities, because allowing legal persons 
without any limitation to become members, the cooperative might turn into a 
kind of company and can easily lose its cooperative character. 
The FLC prescribes for each type of cooperative the minimal number of 
members necessary to establish the cooperative. Generally, at least ten persons 
are necessary to establish a cooperative (agricultural, consumer, handicraft, 
health, youth and student). The RLC requires only more than three persons for 
–––––––––– 
22 Art. 17-19, FLC. 
23 Art. 14 (1), SCE Regulation. 
24 H. Henrÿ, op. cit., p. 28. 
25 Id. p. 25. 
26 Art. 14 (1), SCE Regulation. 
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the establishment of a cooperative.27 For the establishment of a housing coop-
erative it is necessary to have at least 30 members according to the FLC. Re-
garding this issue, GCL emphasizes the importance of the freedom of associa-
tion, that is to say, having no or minimal restriction on the number of members. 
Such restriction is reasonable only when it aims the protection of third parties 
(e.g., creditors), thus, it suggests a minimum number of three members.28 Hav-
ing this in mind, it can be said that the Serbian FLC is a bit restrictive. It would 
be useful to conduct a research on the ideal number of members in practice in 
Serbia, taking into account social circumstances as well as the fact that for the 
operation of the organs of a cooperative a minimal number of members (who 
are professionally capable) is needed.  
According to Bateman and Pennarz there is also the issue of the growing 
number of so-called cooperants. These are persons who cooperate with the co-
operative, without being its member. The actual problem is that the cooperatives 
are reluctant to allow these cooperants to become their members.29 
There is also need to change the way of exclusion of members. Here is a 
very similar problem to the above mentioned „closed door“ principle applied to 
membership applications: the member has the right to complain to the exclusion 
to the general assembly, however, if the assembly does not make decision on 
the complaint, it is considered rejected. This provision should be amended in a 
way that no decision within a certain deadline on the complaint means accep-
tance of the complaint. Besides, the law should guarantee the basic due process 
in such procedures, meaning that the member under exclusion should have the 
right to present his case. The law should also give the possibility of judicial 
review of such decisions.  
 
IV. Assets 
Another important issue are the assets of cooperatives. There are two types 
of cooperatives in Serbia: one established and operated with shares („udeli”)30 
of the members, and the other established and operated without shares of the 
members, where the means for functioning are provided by membership fees.31 
Interpreting art. 55 (1) of FLC, it seems that these two types of financing can 
not be combined. 
–––––––––– 
27 Art. 2, RLC. 
28 H. Henrÿ, op. cit., p. 26. 
29 M. Bateman, J. Pennarz, op. cit., p. 22. 
30 These are not like stocks of a stock corporation (securities), but shares of participation. 
31 Arts. 50 and 55, FLC. According to the FLC the assets of the cooperative are comprised 
of the cooperative’s ownership rights on movables and immovables, on financial assets and secu-
rities, and other ownership rights. The ownership rights of the cooperative comprise of shares, 
membership fees, other financial means realized with work and other means. (art. 49, FLC) 
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As to the first type, each member subscribes equal share. As a general rule, 
shares are subscribed in cash, however, if the agreement (deed) of foundation or 
the by-laws provide for, it is possible to subsribe in whole or in part shares in-
kind, what is expressed in cash. In-kind contribution has to be appraised by the 
founders, or by the organ assigned by the by-laws.32 This is a bit too permissive 
rule, at least the appraisal of some types of in-kind contributions, like personal 
commitment, services or work, should be approved by the general assembly, this 
way preventing any misuse. This way the interest of all the members would be 
better protected. The law also prescribes that during the membership status, con-
tributions for the shares can not be returned, and no claim against the member can 
be enforced on such shares.33 However, following the termination of the member-
ship, the counter-value of the valorized shares has to be returned to the ex-
member or to his/her heirs.34 This provision corresponds to the Guidelines (GCL). 
Regarding the system of membership fees, the by-laws might determine 
the fequency and the amount of the payment of such fees. It is important, that 
the FLC provides that membership fees can not be returned.35 
In these transitional times the biggest problem for the majority of coopera-
tives in Serbia is the lack of fresh capital. In a market economy cooperatives 
without fresh capital and constant development can easily lose their competitiv-
ness. Related to this issue, currently cooperatives face two problems. 
The first one is how to attract new investments from the members, or new 
investor members. For this, obstacles that retain investors from investing into 
cooperatives should be identified. According to the current law each member 
registers equal share (50 (1)) and each member has one vote. Alas, such system 
do not motivate members with more means to invest more. Though, art. 57 of 
the FLC provides that members can agree in the by-laws on the division of 
profit, meaning that despite equal shares, some of the members can get bigger 
share from the profit, this is not a guarantee for the members, as by-law can be 
amended with majority votes of members.36 Therefore, the lawmaker should 
reconsider these provisions, and introduce a system which motivates investors. 
Keeping the „equal share” and „one member one vote” principles, the initially 
agreed profit sharing should be guaranteed, or investor’s veto rights could be 
introduced regarding certain decisions. 
The second problem is lack of bank credits. Bank credits are used world-
wide in capitalist systems for acquiring fresh capital. However, banks usually 
–––––––––– 
32 Art. 50, FLC. 
33 Art. 52, FLC. 
34 Art. 54, FLC. 
35 Art. 55 (2), FLC. 
36 Art. 34, FLC. 
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require some collateral for credits. The problem is that the immovable property 
of cooperatives during the socialist times was registered as the property of the 
„society“, and in the majority of cases it is still registered like that, meaning that 
cooperatives can not use it as a mortgage for loans. Thus, when applying for 
loans, cooperatives can offer suretyship of their members, what is cumbersome. 
It should be mentioned that the new Constitution of Serbia ceased the property 
of the „society“, and such property used and possessed by cooperatives should 
be transferred to cooperative property in the register (the State has three years to 
challenge such registration). In other cases the cooperatives have the right to 
prove their property rights in a court procedure. This is an ongoing process, 
which should be fostered by the State (what is not the case). 
 
V. Organs 
The Guidelines for Cooperative Legislation emphasizes that when regulat-
ing the structure of the organs of a cooperative, both the principle of democracy 
(cooperatives are associations governed by the members) and the principle of 
economic efficiency (at the same time cooperatives are also enterprises) has to 
be taken into account.37 Thus, it suggests that the general assembly of the coop-
erative should deal with issues related to the associative character of the coop-
erative, the board of directors should deal with issues pertaining to the enter-
prise and a professional manager should deal with issues related to everyday 
business of the cooperative. The GCL also suggests setting up some kind of 
controlling organ, i.e., a supervisory board. The Serbian law is in accordance 
with the above mentioned principles. According to it, the organs of the coopera-
tive are the general assembly („skupština”), the board of directors (“upravniod-
bor”), the managing director (“direktor”) and the supervisory board (“nad-
zorniodbor”).38 
The highest and the most important organ of a cooperative is the general 
assembly that is constituted by all the members of the cooperative. However, if 
the cooperative has more than one hundred members, the by-laws may prescribe 
the formation of a so-called „meeting of delegates” („skupština predstavnika 
[zadrugara]”). Delegates may be elected for a term not exceeding five years 
(however, there is the possibility of re-election).39 The Council Directive 
2003/72/EC of 22 July 2003 supplementing the Statute for a European Coopera-
tive Society with Regard to the Involvement of Employees encourages coopera-
tives to allow for the employees or their representative bodies to participate in 
–––––––––– 
37 H. Henrÿ, op. cit., p. 33. 
38 Art. 30, FLC. 
39 Art. 32, FLC. 
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the work of the general assembly of the cooperative with voting right. However, 
this is only encouragement and not an obligation for the cooperative and its 
members. The Serbian lawmaker should be encouraged to introduce similar 
possibilities for the employees of cooperatives, or at least the law should author-
ize the representatives of employees to attend the general assembly in an ad-
vasory capacity.  
It is also important to mention that the FLC explicitly supports the princi-
ple of „one member one vote”. Interesting solution of the Italian Civil Code is 
that it gives the possibility to grant extra voting rights to some members who 
participate in certain mutual benefit ventures during the integration of these 
ventures, or only during certain phases of these ventures.40 In our opinion, the 
principle of „one member one vote” should be kept. At the same time it could 
be combined with special veto rights given to investor members in certain cases 
as already mentioined (e.g., annual business plan of the cooperative, etc.). This 
would certainly make economically more attractive Serbian cooperatives, as 
persons who invest into a cooperative more money than others expect to have 
certain surplus rights in decision making. At the same time, it should be kept in 
mind that cooperatives have different characteristics than companies.  
To improve the efficiency of the functioning of the general assembly, the 
GCL suggests voting without physical presence, e.g., the introduction of the 
possibility to vote via internet.41 The Italian Civil Code also suggests that the 
by-law may prescribe the possibility to vote by means of telecommunication.42 
This seems a good idea, provided technical conditions and safety can be guaran-
teed. Another useful idea is contained in the Hungarian Law on Cooperatives, 
that provides for the convenience of extraordinary general assembly when a 
decision has to be adopted in a matter that falls within the competence of the 
general assembly, and any delay in the decision would endanger any vital inter-
est of the cooperative, or it would entail the breach of any obligation of the 
cooperative conferred upon it by the law or by the by-laws.43 Or when the con-
vocation is requested by at least ten percent of all the members, or by the super-
visory board in writing with the reason indicated.44 This latter provision can be 
potentially important for all the members. Thus, such guarantees should be also 
included into the Serbian Law. Here should be mentioned the issue of the pre-
–––––––––– 
40 Art. 2538(4), Italian Civil Code. 
41 H. Henrÿ, op. cit., p. 35. 
42 Art. 2538(7), Italian Civil Code. 
43 Art. 20 (5) (a), Hungarian Law on Cooperatives (X/2006). 
44 Art. 20 (5), Hungarian Law on Cooperatives. The same law also provides that upon writ-
ten request any matter supported by at least ten percent of all the members has to be included in 
the agenda of the general assembly. (art. 22 (1)) 
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cise stipulation of who convenes the general assembly and sanctions for omit-
ting this obligation, as this is not done in the current legislation. 
It should be also mentioned here that issues like the review of the decision 
on expulsion, bringing decision on the admission of an investor member (if this 
possibility exists), and decision for ordering supplementary payments should be 
also in the general assembly’s competency. 
The FLC provides that the board of directors is elected by the general as-
sembly. It should have at least five members and these members have to be 
elected from the members of the cooperative.45 The FLC shows its social sensi-
tivity when it prescribes that in cooperatives with more than fifty non-member 
employees, one member of the board of directors has to be elected from these 
employees.46 The general tendency in the EU is to support employee participa-
tion (this is supported especially by Germany). Notwithstanding, such solutions 
are sometimes criticized, as they allow for non-members to take part in the 
decision-making. Not related to the issue of employee participation, Zsohar, 
Hungarian expert in the field, asserts that international tendency is to have pro-
fessional non-member managers on the board.47 This requirement might be 
added to the Serbian Law, however, first the law should be amended to allow 
non-members as board of directors’ members, and secondly it should be deter-
mined what is to be understood under “professional”. 
However, more important issue is the liability of the board members for omis-
sion of their duties. This is not adequatly regulated in the current legislation. Be-
sides, there are no adequate sanctions for non-performance or omission of duty. The 
law should explicitly enumerate sanction for such cases. In our opinion, in a country 
under transition these are important issues and should not be ignored. 
Also the lawmaker should oblige the board of directors to report on its ac-
tivities48 and on the financial situation of the cooperative to the supervisory 
board (at least once every three months) and to the general assembly (at least 
yearly once), taking over the Hungarian model for example. This provision 
would additionally guarantee the transparent and fair work of the board of direc-
tors (managing director). 
And finally, the managing director, who is also elected by the general as-
sembly according to the FLC.49 These people are usually not professional man-
–––––––––– 
45 At the same time, the FLC provides that cooperatives with less than twenty members do 
not have to form a board of directors. In this case, the competences of the board of directors are 
exercised by the organ that is defined in the by-laws. (art. 36, FLC) 
46 Art. 35, FLC. 
47 A. Zsohár (ed.), Szövetkezeti jog, HVG-ORAC, Budapest, 2007, p. 34. 
48 Also obliging individual members of the board of directors to report their objections 
against a decision of the board of directors to the supervisory board. 
49 Art. 31, FLC. 
Zoltán Víg, Ph.D., Wasted Value: Need for the Reform of the Cooperative... (р. 601–614) 
 
 612 
agers, economists or financial experts. However, in a modern world it would be 
very useful to have managers who are proficient in these fields. This can be 
crucial as bad economic, marketing or financial decisions can be fatal for the 
whole cooperative. The managing director is responsible for the everyday busi-
ness of the cooperative, for the legality of its dealings, and represents the coop-
erative.50 It would be important to clearly delineate the competencies of the 
managing director and those of the chairman of the board of directors. Many 
times happens in practice that key operative decisions are made by the manag-
ing director, without having explicit competencies for this. What is even greater 
problem, that sometimes the by-laws, that define the competencies of the man-
aging director, provides for overlapping competencies (with the board of direc-
tors). When drafting the by-laws it should be taken into consideration that the 
managing director should be primarily the one who executes decisions, and not 
the one who makes them. Another solution would be to introduce a model, hav-
ing only board of directors, where the chairman of the board has the competen-
cies of the managing director. Such solution proved to be useful in some Euro-
pean countries.51 
Regarding the liability of the managing director, the FLC provides that 
he/she is materially liable for his/her decision if they result in material dam-
ages for the cooperative.52 However, it is not clear what is the liability of the 
managing director for the omission of his/her duties. Thus, it would be useful 
to insert into the law a provision which would oblige the members of the 
board of directors and the managing director to conduct the management of 
the cooperative with due care and diligence as generally expected from per-
sons in such position. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
The above discussed issues underpin the statment from the introduction of 
this work, that there is need for the reform of the Serbian cooperative legisla-
tion. As it was shown above, appropriate constitutional grounds exist in this 
field. However, current laws and lower level legislation have to be repealed. In 
Europe there are several well-functioning laws on cooperatives, which could be 
used when reforming the current legislation, taking into account local features. 
This reform should not be defered any more. Cooperatives had too great social 
importance in the past, and they can contribute to the creation of a more stable 
society in Serbia. 
–––––––––– 
50 The authority of the managing director is defined by the Law, agreement of foundation 
and by-laws. (art. 44, FLC). 
51E.g., Hungary. 
52 Art. 46, FLC. 
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